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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
~ABBIID C. SORENSEN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
vs. 
R. ~!ORGAN SORENSEN, 
Defendant and Respondent 
Case No. 
11013 
RESPO,NDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURBJ OF THE CASE 
'l'his is an appeal from an order reducing alimony 
from $1,250.00 per month to $1,000.00 per month. The 
Dren·c of Divorce was entered on May 29, 1962. The 
or1kr reducing alimony was entered on August 11, 1967. 
l'laintift'-appella11t will herein be called "plaintiff", and 
d('lc1Hla11t-respondent will herein be called "defendant." 
DISPOSITION IN LOvVER COURT 
'l'rial court found there to have been changes m 
lhP ('in·mnstances of the parties justifying reduction in 
;1lin1011~· and entered its order accordingly on August 11, 
I %1. 
1 
S'l1 A TE:!\IENT OF FACTS 
Because the transcript from the original trial ha,, 
lieen lost, counsel are at some disadvantage in Rnpport-
ing, by reference to the record, stakments with referencr· 
to the financial circumstances of the parties as of th~ 
date ( l\Iay 29, 1962) the decree herein was enten·d. 
Certain of the exhibits reveal, however, what C'ircurn-
stances, presumably established by the evidence, were 
0mphasized to the court in the original presentation. 
Exhibit 4 (of the exhibits rec0ind in the origirrni 
proceeding) is a summary of the facts plaintiff urgril 
the Court to consider in fixing attorney's feeR as \\'<•11 
as in deciding the cans<.> .. Among the facts emphasize<l 
in that summary are these: 
1. '' l\Ir. Sorensen disclaims anything but a moral 
obligation on a voluntary basis with respect to 
Christine, who still lives with her mother whilr 
attending the University and who is unmarried" 
(Item 11, page 4) 
2. "One of the novel f ea tu res of the case is a 
plan of orderly liquidation of the assets with 
high intrinsic values hut not readily marketahle'' 
(Item 13, second paragraph). 
3. ''Early in the controversy the clcfenda11l 
stopp<.>d plaintiff's credit with former trade Hl'· 
counts including the ::-;ervices of :!\Ir. Don An<lru~, 
the gardner, and K<.>nt Anderson the hawly mn11 
l\f rs. SorenRen re-employed l\Ir. A ndrns for work 
a round the home and the adjoining aereagP, hor 
rowing monev for that purpose, she heing in-
capable of i;erformi11g the w:eessary physical 
labor in the premis('S." (Item 13, first parn-
graph.) 
It is evident that, in the i11itial presentation of the 
c:1-.:e to the trial court, the court's attention was par-
1icnlarly drawn to the facts that Christine was un-
married and living with her mother, that she was at-
(t·nding the University (which everyone knows involves 
,jgllificant cash outlay) and that support money was 
not being awarded for Christine because she was 
l'ig-litl'e11. Further, stress was laid upon the "novel" 
i'i renru;.;( ance that the bulk of the property awarded to 
plaiHtiff liad "high intrinsic value" but was "not 
n·adily marketable" and, far from being a reliable 
~1;im·e of iueome, had to be maintained at considerable 
11(•! l'\:pPnse so that "liquidation" was a problem. 
In these regards, the circumstances of the plaintiff 
lrnd, lJ~~ thl' time of hearing on the Petition for l\fodifica-
tion, completely changed. Christine was then married, 
was 110 longer living with the plaintiff and was in fact 
<·mployed hy defendant (Record 61, 62). The prop-
' rt,1 .\[ r. .A11drus was hired to maintain had been 
sold ( Heconl 60). Thus the property awarded to 
plaintiff which had heen, at the time the decree was 
L·11 tt>red, pro<luctive of net expense was converted to a 
form pn'sumably productive of net income. 
f ,et us now consider the defendant's circumstances 
Hild l1ow they have changed. \Vhen the decree was 
f'11il'n·d, defendant was, in effect, single. He was receiv-
i11g, the court found, income of $45,000.00 per year as 
:i re;.;nJt of 11is personal services. This finding of the 
trial eomt (J1'inding No. 7, Record page 13) was made 
111 t lie f<H'l' of unco11 tro,·ertecl evidence that the income 
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n•porkd hy defendant's employPr as wages ntri<>d fruni 
$;')2,8~)8.00 to $;>D,3G0.00 ( ~~xhibits :1 and 10 from origi11al 
}ll'Oce<>ding.) The trial court recognized that the l'l' 
maimk•r (,.a ryi ng from $1:i,OOO to $20,000) of < ll•fornl-
n nt 's so reported i11comp \Yas in the nature of return 011 
tl11• im·pstment represented h;- dl'fernlant 's capital stor·k. 
There is 110 e\·idence i11 the reeorcl relating to tl11· 
petition for modification which would support a r·011 
tention that plaintiff's personal sen·ices ha n~ lwcomp 
more ,·aluable to his employer since 19G2. On the r·o11-
trary, the record (Pl 's. Exhihits 1 and 2, Tnrnscript 
P. 54) confirms that defendant and his employer recog-
nize that defendant must sooner or later re<l11('C tli1' 
quantum of time and c•nergy lw deYotes to the lrnsim·:-o~ 
aml mak0 some preparation for retirement. Accord-
ingly, assistance has been proYiclecl and defcll(la11t's 
sa1ary appropriately reduced. It is true that <ldl'Jl(lant \ 
_qross income has not yet l>cen significantly affected, hut 
his real income has been and, as we will suhs0quc11tl~­
urge as POI XT III of our Argunwnt, clefendm1t ',; 
return from investment of his share of the marital esta(1· 
is not material to the presr•nt i11quiry. 
D0fe]l(la11t's real i11comr), the ii1C'ome really ~n-ailnlil 1 • 
for 1wrso11al and family nse, is suhst:rntially red111·L·tl 
;-:i11ee 19G2. His testimony (Tnrnscript P. 7:2) is that he 
11;.;cti his home• as a eom·enicnt aud attractive P11Yiron-
mcllt in which to display tlH) fumiture h0 st•lls. lt is not 
tlie policy of his employer to permit liis use of ~rncli 
furniture without charge; he is obliged to huy it. 111• 
11:1~ i11cmTed such obligations in connection with the 
!11rni,,Jii11g· of his home to he an effectin) sales tool that 
"l'Jlro\:imafrl~, $:J60.00 per month is tleclucted from his 
11<1g(•s. (lkf's K·d1ibit 4) Defendant and his family 
l 11.io.\ th<· fnrnishi11gs, of course, hut the elegance is 
111<1 i1it a i1wd la rgC' ly for husinC'ss purposes, ancl the ex-
J H'lls<· of tl1at maintenance is properly considered in 
<111.\· dett·rmination of defendant's real income. Asso-
t·iat<·d "·ith the expense of maintaining a "display 
l1n11s1·" is the expensC' of business entertainment in it. 
ll<·n· again, the only testimony is that defendant spends 
lrom $200.00 to $250.00 per month for such entertain-
111t·111. l'laiutiff, on the other hand, has no business 
11·spo11sil>ilitiC's ren~ale<l by the record. Her alimony 
11l11s rd urn from im·estment of hC'r share of the marital 
1·~tnll-, i11 excPss of $100,000.00, is a\'ailable for her per-
~()1ial enjoyment. Further, defendant has heavy travel 
~ spe11~ws, 11ot paid by his employer, in performing 
:1d<>1p1atel.\· as a director of two national associations 
of lll('rel1n11disers. (Transcript 71) 
Vi11ally, defendant has remarried and has, in con-
~1·q1w11c<•, assumed iww responsibilities, financial and 
otl1l'rwis(', toward a wife and her handicapped son. 
Tl1erp a re frequent occasions, as examination of De-
t'1·11dn 1tl s F,xhihit :1 will ren'al, when defendant's "net 
11<1.\·" th'r month (i11clmli11g amounts recognized by the 
11 iul ('OU rt as i11n'stment return) is not enough to pay 
1111· nlim011y. If we examine defendant's financial state-
1111·11ts i11 c·Yide11ee we discoyer that his gross income 
:q1p1··1ad1l'S $(i0,000.00 per year. Of that, he has paid, 
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under the original clenee, $15,000.00 in alimony, $15,-
000.00 in income taxes and some $10,000.00 per yt>ar i 11 
defraying the expenses we han' diseusse<l. 
ARGU:\fENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT -WHICH ENTERS A DIVORCE 
DECREE HAS CONTINUING JURISDJ(;_ 
TION TO MODIFY THE DFJCREE IN RE-
SPEC'r TO ALIMONY AND HAS, IN THAT 
REGARD, A BROAD DISCRETION. 
ThC' legislature has specifically provided (Section 
30-3-5 UCA 1953, as amended) that a divorce decree is 
suLjeet to ''subsequent changes or 11ew orders'' in re-
gard to distribution of property "as may he reasonable 
a11d proper." In this con11ection, this Court has con-
sistently adhered to the universally rewred doctriiw 
that the determinatio11 from time to time of the amount 
which should he paid as alimony is a matter which r0~ti; 
in the sound <liscretion of the trial court. As early as 
Read vs. Read, 28 Utah 297, 78 Pae. G7.J, the view WM 
c>X]lressed that: 
"unless it is made to appear that there Jia,; 
lieen an abuse of discretion on the part of the 
court in dealing with one or both of these ques-
tions, its judgment and orders granting and fix-
ing the alimony ·will not be disturbed.'' 
This language was quoted with appronll in Blair ,-s. 
/]lair, 40 Utah :30G, aud the concept has since be('ll fn·-
qut>ntly statC'd. 
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It is settled, of course, that the trial court has juris-
didioll to modify a decree hy reducing alimony initially 
:1wardPd (:llyas n. Myers, 62 Utah 70; 218 Pac. 123, 
;;o ALH 7 4) and an order modifying a decree in respect 
to alimon;· is dearly among the "orders fixing the 
<ilimo11~·" to which this Court made reference in Read 
\ s. Rl'wl, supra. 
Plaintiff eites Ilumiltun n. Hamilton, 89 Utah 554; 
.-J8 l'.2<1 11, in support of her contention that, to justify 
a I imon~· modifica tiou, a change in the "conditions or 
ci rrnmstances'' of the parties must he shown. We do 
not 1p1a rrel with the JI amilto11 holding. Against the back-
grnm1d of the many cases construing Section 30-3-5, 
!towe\·N, it mu:,;t he recognized that the determination 
of wlt0ther circumstances have so changed as to justify 
alirnoH~· modification is a matter which rests in the 
som111 discretion of the trial court. The appellant must 
d<·mo11strate au abuse of discretion. (See Sections 674, 
fi/:J on Dirnrce, 24 Am .• Tur. 2nd 793. 
POINT II. 
TIIE l\IERE FACT THAT THE CHANGES 
IN HIS FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES ON 
\YIIICH DEFENDANT RELIES ARE THE 
IU~SULT OF POLICY DECISIONS IN THE 
:\lAKli'\G OF 'WHICH HE PARTICIPATED 
l J01'~S NOT DISQUALIFY HIS PETITION. 
l'laintiff asserts, i11 her argument, that defendant's 
'<1l:ny refluctiou was a ",·oluntary act" and that his 
i1wn,asPd business expenditures "can he deducted" and, 
i11 l'nt'1t tially, \\'Ould be deducted except for lack of orcli-
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nary lmsilleSR al'ume11 on the 1rnrt of <h•femlant or ]ij, 
Pmployer. 
In this eom1edioll, we would point out to thP comt 
that thr only evidenee in this record is that, in order (o 
produce the $45,000.00 per year which the trial comt 
found to be his wages ( Rt>eord, page 2) <lefrndant, wl111 
is now 55 years old (Record page 73), has devoted at 
least 60 hours per week to the verformance of his myriad 
duties with South East Fumiture Company. Begim1ing 
at page 53 of the Record, defendant tells of his lmsi11r.'.' 
responsibilities. At page 54, we find this testimony: 
Q. How much time do you spend rach week in 
the performance of these employment ohligatiom 
that you have described? 
A. Well, certainly not Jess than 60 hours, some-
time considerably more than that. 
Q. ·what have you done in the last year or f:O 
with reference to getting some relief from thi' 
work load? 
A. ·well, we have been trying the last, oh, yenr 
or so, to take some of the prrssure off, lwcanse 
the work load, because of complications and the 
l'Omplexities of our husiness - we have hre11 
tr~'ing to take some of the \YOrk load off, hy dis-
tributing some of the detail work that I hare 
heen doing, to other people. 
It is umloubtedly the law that a defendant nmlrr 8 
duty to pay alimony may not avoitl that duty hy sirnply 
refu.si11g to produce income. Converse!~-, the Jaw drn·' 
not require that ineome at a level whieh will permit 
alimoll)' paymPnt be maintaillC'<l by an effort greatly iu 
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i>x<·ess of the norm aucl one which must jeapordize health. 
Tlw plaintiff cannot i·easonably insist that the clef encl-
aiit, now f>;) years of age, work indefinitely on a 60 hour 
wel·ld;' schedule so that she, who has not engaged in 
prodncti\'e employment since her marriage, may enjoy 
;111 i1l<'ome which, assumi11g a 3% return on the value of 
her share of the marital estate, exceeds the GO"\'ernor's 
~alary. 
'rhe record does not support plaintiff's contention 
I hat defernlm1t 's salary reduction "\Vas \'Oluntary. It was 
aeceptcd in recognition, by the tlirectors of South East 
Fnrnitnre Company, that there are physical limitations 
011 the perso11al serYices which defendant can contribute. 
Plaintiff asserts that this Court can judicially 
not iC't' the de<luctibility of the traYel, entertainment and 
adnrtising expenses which defendant has incurred but 
whieh 11eitl1er he nor his employer has treated as de-
<lnrtihlc>. EYCn if the concept of judicial knowledge 
<'onlcl he so stretched (a proposition for which plain-
tiff l'ites 110 authority), we submit that South East's 
d<·dudion of these expenses, as the alternatiYe to paying 
ddenda11t the money to defray them, would reduce de-
fc·nda nt 's income by their amount. The enlargement of 
tliP::.;e expenses, deducted or not, constitutes a change 
in d<'i'P11da11t 's financial circumstances. 
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POIN'l' III. 
DEFENDANT'S INCO~lE ATTRIBUTABLE 
TO TNVJ<~ST:\Il<~NT OF THE SHARE OF 
THE l\IARITAL ~STAT~ AWARDED TO 
HI1\I SHOULD NOT BI1J CONSIDERED IN 
DETERMINING -WHETHJ<~R CHANGES IN 
INCO~IE HA VE OCCURRIDD. 
'11 hl' trial court found in thP initial proceeding that 
$43,000.00 per year of t hP total defemlan t recei vecl from 
South East Furniture \Yas for sen·ices, the remaiud1•r 
was return 011 the i1w0stmeut rPpresented hy his com-
mon stock. That findi11g is res-juclicata. Plaintiff eon-
tinues to emphasizr, ltowe,·er, that, p\·en though defo11d-
nnt 's salary has clecrease(1 hy $6,000.00 per year, tht 
amounts hr recein's by reason of his stock ownrrship 
havr increased to keep pacl>. 
\\Te would be <lisposed to corn·rtll' the relcYanc.\ of 
fluctuations in dd0ndant 's im·estmPnt income if plai11-
tiff and the eonrt has been amenable to the reecipt of 
cYidene<' about plaintiff's incomr from inYestment of 
her sharr of the marital estate. The follo\\·ing i,; a 
resume of the property <:nrnrded plaintiff hy the trial 
court as the rPsume appeared in cl<'fcm1m1t 's brief ou 
nppeal from the original decrc·e (refcrenees are to the 
oriiriJ1al rt'<·orcl which is now lost): ...., 
'l'lic> equit)' in the duplex, \\-hich had an 
undisputed Yalue of $24,000.00 and a 
debt of $8,98:1.88 __________ ., __________________ ., ____ $15,0lG.1~ 
Th(• triplex, wl1id1 lrnd a11 urn1ispu1ed 
ndne of $;~/,:J00.00, und n drht of 
$8,977.l!l --- ------ ---------------- - ---- -- ___________ $18,:J2~.Sl 
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An m1clivifled one-half interest in the 
Holladay property, ·with the appel-
lant being ordered to assume and pay 
lioth the back taxes and the balance 
of the mortgage on the home, so that 
the wife would get one-half of the 
gross value ----------------------------------------------
Country Club l\Iembership. (This had a 
gross value of $6,000, according to 
him, (R. 175) and $7,200 to $7,500, ac-
cording to her, (R. 114) but he was 
ordered to pay the transfer fees, 
which she thought would be $3,000 
( R. 114) --------------------------------------------------
Cash surrender value of $50,000.00 New 
York Life Insurance Co. policy _________ _ 
The Antiques 
67,500.00 
6,000.00 
4,050.00 
600.00 
Total ________________________________ $111,688.93 
"In addition the plaintiff was awarded mis-
rellaneous items of personal property which 
wrre not separately valued (R. 47) and all of 
the furniture and fixtures in the duplex and 
triplex which were not separately valued (R. 45). 
Using the same values as noted above to 
arrin at the gross value of the total marital 
estate, as the same is listed on pages 4-7 of this 
lirief, the estate (without the 8,000 shares of in-
hrrited stock) and a value of $210,074.67, so that 
on these values, the wife received approximately 
.)3 per cent of the marital estate. 
1 f the large house and property in Holladay 
has a ntlue of $187,000.00, then since she received 
one-half thereof, ( R. 46), the total awarded to 
her would be incrrased by $26,000.00 to $137,-
fi88.9:1, and the gross value of the marital estate 
would he increased to $262,074.00. Under these 
11 
,-alnes, she would have 1·Pet•in'<l approximatch 
:i(i per cent of the total marital estat<>. The mattc.'r 
is ma<le PYen more disproportionate hy the faf't 
that clefornlm1t llaid $7,000.00 for plaintiff's at-
tornPy and also hacl his own attorney to pay 
(H. 48)." 
Pl ai11 tiff had then, when the denee was entered, 
assets ,-alned at roughly $123,000.00 the bulk of whicl1 
\H'l'<' 11011 prnductivP and, as she nrgtwd to the eonrt 
(.F~xl1ihit 4 of the exhibits from the orig'inal proccedi11g) 
ex1w11sin• to maintain so that a part of her alimony \\a~ 
cliYertecl to their maintenanC'e. 
Defomlm1t testified (Record G9) that the 11011 pro 
ductiYP property has been solcl. Defenclm1t offen'd to 
pron that plaintiff has recein•cl her share of the sale 
proceeds in cash (Record 70). Plaintiff ohj<'cted to tlH· 
i11troduction of such evidc11ee 011 the grounds of its im-
materiality (Record 69), and the court sustained tlte 
objection (Record 70). Plaintiff cam10t equitahl)· h1· 
heard to say that changes in defonclant 's im-estment 
income are material but changes i11 hN im-estment in-
come are not. 
Tt is p<'rfectly clear that defendant's salary (<l> 
distinguished from innstment income) from South ~nsl 
l1as lwe11 reduced h)· $G,OOO.OO pt>r year since the d0erel'. 
'rhe $;)00.00 per m011th proYidc<l for i11 I•;xJ1ihits D-1 and 
D-2 is 11ot t'011trib11i<•d b)- stockholders, it is dPdnded 
from clefernlant 's salan-. 
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POINT IV. 
WHEN THE INCOME TO BE DIVIDED 
AMONG HUSBAND AND WIFE IS LARGE, 
THE HUSBAND'S ~IORAL OBLIGATIONS 
TOWARD OTHERS ~IAY BE CONSIDERED 
IN DETI<~Rl\IINING WHETHER MODIFI-
CATION IN RI•~SPECT TO ALIMONY IS 
PROPER EVEN THOUGH SUCH OBLIGA-
TIONS MAY NOT BE RELEVANT WHERE 
THE ORIGINALLY AWARDED ALIMONY 
PROVIDES ONLY A MINIMUM DECENT 
SUBSISTENCE FOR THE "WIFE. 
One significant change which has occurred m de-
fendant's situation since the divorce decree is his re-
marriage. He has assumed responsibilities not only to 
his present wife h1t also to her two children, particularly 
11 ,;011 afflicted with cerebral paralysis. To provide 
\\'holesome activity for this child, who finds it more 
nml more difficult to relate with his contemporaries, 
1·laliorate outings are planned. The boy especially en-
.io~·s boating, and defendant has purchased a boat, at 
eo11siderahle expense, so that this source of pleasure 
for the hoy can he afforded him. (Record 59, 60) 
Plaintiff discounts defendant's new role as a basis 
for alimony modification hecause it was voluntarily 
a"snmed. No authority is cited for plaintiff's proposi-
tion that a change in situation must have occurred 
<ig-aiust the "·ill of the husband in order to constitute 
t;romHls for modification. There are, as this Court 
knows, text statements generally to the effect that re-
lllarriage is a questionable basis for alimony modifica-
1 ion. ·write rs (e.g. Section 689 of the American Juris-
13 
prudence treatise, 24- Am. J ur. 2d 804) say rc'ma niag1 
is not good grounds in "onli11arv" ('ases bnt call attP11 
tion to cases where the hushand 's remarriage has hee11 
taken into account in readjusting alimo11y. 
This Court in Ham1d<m vs. Ilnmpto11, 86 Utah Gill. 
had before it the pditiou of a cli,·orced husbaucl fnr 
alimony reduction where the changes in circumstance> 
included hi8 rem<Hriage. Sixt~· dollars per month liar] 
initially heen awarded for alimo11~· and support of om 
child by the first marriage. Clearly, the first wife and 
her child were living near the minimum subsistence leH! 
on that award. In reducing the alimony ancl support 
obligation eveu more than the trial court rccluce<l it, 
the court said this: 
"\¥ e are convinced that the c hang<> cl conditiom 
appearing in the record require a re(1uction i11 
the amount of alimony as fixed by the trial court 
which we feel is more than the defendant is ahl1· 
to pay and at tlw same time maintain his station 
in life as a teacher and support his prese11f 
fami1zJ." (Our emplwsis added) 
\Ve do not prekrnl ot lier changes in circnmstancc, 
in the Jlampto11 cE~se \\·er0 not of gr0akr imporh111c·1· 
than the divorced husband's remarriage>. \Y<> cite tltl' 
casP as n judicial recognition of the fad that a <fo·orct>il 
m~111 is s1ill a person, :rnd lie may form 11P\Y rrlationslii]l' 
which are not meretri('ions or inimical to soei<{,· lini 
which soeiet~· c'11co11rages and \\·ill PlHl('<ffor to prntcd 
The lll'\\' famil)· \nt;.; unquestionably a strong faetor i11-
flne11ei11g tltv ( 'onrt eren in a (•as<> where the initial 
inrnrcl nffonll•d :1 lrnn• sulisiste1J('<' to th<> first familY. 
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Similarly in Knighton vs. Knighton, 15 Utah 2d 55, 
'l87 P.~d !H, the Court had to divide a monthly income 
1il ;;omc $:165.00 (reduced from $495.00) between two 
families. The solution upheld by this Court was the 
elimination of the $75.00 per month alimony for a period 
of a<ljustment after which alimony was restored to 
~:i0.00 per month. 
The extraordiuary cases, cases where the husband's 
n·marriage is considered a solid ground for alimony 
rccluction, are of a kind this court infrequently sees. The 
family relations courts in this state are usually con-
fr011ted with a situation where an income which is 
sC"arcely sufficient to supply the basic needs of one 
domestic establishment must be allocated to supply the 
J'(•quircmcnts of two. The major concern is to establish 
for the plaintiff a foundation for survival in decency. 
Courts simply refuse to undermine that foundation on 
n showing that the husband has subsequently developed 
"moral'' but not legally enforceable obligations. 
Iii the instant case, plaintiff was awarded some 
;~l :23,000.00 by way of property settlement and, if our 
l'<'sParch is adequate, the highest alimony in Utah's 
l1istory. Plaintiff has receiYed oYer $80,000.00 from 
dvfc·nda11t since the decree was entered. She need have 
1 nnr·t>r11, financially, for no one but herself. Defendant's 
position is that, where the income to be divided is large, 
it i;.; P11tirely proper for the court to consider the income 
J 1rodncer 's moral obligations on a petition for alimony 
''(•adjnstmPut am! to provide opportunity for their 
'H(i-.;fnction. 
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There are no Utah cases whieh speeifieall.'· annouw·1 
this doctrine; there are none we fill(l 'd1er<> the im·orni· 
to be divided is large 0nough to invite its i1wocatio11. 
In other jurisdictions, however, tl1e conc0pt is well cstaJ1• 
lished. Here is the American ,Jurisprudence statcmt>nt: 
"\Vhere an award of alimony against a husband 
having a large income is abon~ the average level 
of income, his moral as n·cll as legal obligation.• 
in respect of the support of other persons may /;1 
considered evr11 though the fact that the obliga-
tion is only a moral one may (not) be relevant 
if the award invoh·es only a minimum decent 
subsistence." (24 Am. Jur. 2nd 796) (Emphasi, 
added) 
Courts which have considered situations like till' 
instant one have been very sensitive to real changes i11 
the needs of the parties. A cliYoreed wife ·whose husband 
has a large income may be entitled to be maintained i11 
luxury, but the Court is always properly cognizant that 
other people may develop relationships toward the bn'· 
band of a kind which society encourages. They may 
therel)y become entitled to ronsideration when the que.'· 
tion of how the lrnsharnl 's income should be divided j, 
re-examined. 
A petition Yer;· similar to defendant's was bcfon 
the \Vashington Supreme Court in E>64. In Harris '"'· 
Harris, :-389 P.2<1 655, an original alimony decree ol 
$1,200.00 1wr month was reduced to $700.00 and later 
to $450.00 011 i10 e\·idence pcrccptihk from the report 
except the rietit io11<>1"s ks timony that he had renrn rrie11 
and assumed lle\\' responsihilities. 
JG 
As we have pointed out, there are some months when 
drfem1aut 's take home pay will not pay his alimony. 
Tnfrequently is there as much left for his new family 
of fonr as defendant has paid plaintiff for her exclusive 
f'njoyment. We believe the following from Russell vs. 
Russrfl, 142 F.2d 753, has application here: 
"Cases where the husband's income permits the 
alimony award to be higher than average stand-
ards of living require present peculiar problems. 
In such situations the Court should not make 
the award so high as to cause financial difficulties 
and personal embarrassment on the part of the 
husband which may impair his earning capacity. 
E\'en if a husband with a comparatively large 
income has wronged his former wife he must, 
n<'vertheless, live up to the standards required 
hy his job and enjoy reasonable peace of mind." 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's income from personal services has been 
reduced by $6,000.00 per year. The reduction has oc-
rnrred in consequence of a policy to permit a diminution 
of ch•fendant 's business activity from a sixty hour per 
1re0k schedule to one which more nearly accords with 
the norm for people approaching retirement age. Plain-
tiff resists alimony reduction because defendant's return 
from investment of his share of the marital estate has 
licen increasing as rapidly as his income from other 
~onrrl'S has diminished. Nevertheless, plaintiff objects 
to the receipt of any evidence about her increase in in-
r·omc (and elimination of expense) by reason of the 
<'Oll\'l'n-::ion of her share of the marital estate to pro-
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ductive asset form. 'l'he trial court, h~wing sustained 
plaintiff's objection, properly discounted the evidence 
of plaintiff's increased return 011 im·0stme11t. This i~ 
particularly true since most of the South East stork 
(the source of defendant's investment return) ,,·as his 
by gift or inlwritance arnl included in the determination 
of marital estate against prceedent. 
'l'he very judge who entered the decree is the> om 
who modified it. He knows to what degree he was i11-
fluenced by the 1962 argume11ts plaintiff made (ExhiLil 
4 of the original proceeding) that Christine was liYing 
with her while attending tlw Unin'rsity, and that t!te 
Holladay property was a drain on plaintiff's ineorne 
rather than an asset contributing to her income. 
Finall~-, defendant's remarriage aml his desire to 
satisfy new moral obligations are relevant to an inquir)· 
of this kind where the income to be diYided is large, and 
plaintiff can obviously liYe in real luxury eYen under 
the modified decree. 
Respcctfnll>- submitted, 
CLYDE, l\fECHAl\I & PRATT 
FRANK J. ALLFJN 
i3:)1 South Statr Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Resz;onde11f 
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